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The Supreme Court in Transition:
Assessing the Legitimacy of the- Leading
Legal Institution
By CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
Justice William Brennan's retirement from the United States
Supreme Court accelerates the high Court's transition toward
dominance by justices who possess values and philosophies dis-
tinctly different from those of their immediate predecessors.'
Although Republican presidential appointees primarily composed
the Court since the 1970s,2 the justices appointed by President
Reagan in the 1980s are each more conservative than the Repub-
lican-appointed justices whom they replaced. Justices Sandra
O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthbny Kennedy would not
have joined several of the important liberal decisions supported
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Akron. A.B. 1980, Harvard
University; M.Sc. 1981, University of Bristol, England; J.D. 1984, University of Tennessee;
Ph.D. 1988, University of Connecticut.
I Commentators perceived the performance of Justice Anthony Kennedy, who began
service on the Supreme Court in 1988, as tipping the balance in favor of a new conservative
majority composed predomnantly of justices appointed or elevated by President Reagan.
See, e.g., McDaniel, The Court Spins Right, Newsweek, June 26, 1989, at 16 (description
of significant changes in Supreme Court decisions affecting affirmative action); Epstein,
Reagan Appointee Pushes Top Court to Right, Akron Beacon Journal, June 11, 1989, at
GI, col. I (description of shift in Supreme Court decisions affecting discrimination and
civil rights).
2 Since the retirement of Justice William 0. Douglas in 1975, the only remaimng
justices appointed by Democratic presidents are Justice Byron White, who was appointed
by John F Kennedy, and Justice Thurgood Marshall, who was appointed by Lyndon
Johnson. Justices William Brennan and Lewis Powell were affiliated with the Democratic
Party, but they were appointed to the Supreme Court by Republican Presidents Dwight
Eisenhower and Richard Nixon, respectively. With the retirements of Powell in 1987 and
Brennan in 1990, the Court will include seven Republicans appointed by Republican presi-
dents.
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by their predecessors, Justices Potter Stewart, 3 Warren Burger,4
and Lewis Powell,5 respectively The addition of President Bush's
Although Justice O'Connor appears to follow Justice Stewart's legacy of moderate
conservatism irr many cases, Stewart joined the Court's liberals in several important cases
in which O'Connor's support would have been doubtful. For example, Stewart concurred
in the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and explicitly declared that individuals
possess the right to be free from government interference in deciding whether or not to
terminate a pregnancy. Id. at 171 (Stewart, J., concurring). By contrast, O'Connor has
been critical of the Court's analysis in Roe, see City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and she has
declined, to endorse explicitly the existence of an individual's right to obtain an abortion.
See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058-64
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). While Stewart was the author of an important opinion
permitting Congress to prohibit racial discrimination by private individuals under its thir-
teenth amendment power, see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), O'Connor
sought reconsideration of Congressional power to regulate private discriminatory conduct
in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). See Taylor,
Court, 5-4, Votes to Restudy Rights in Minority Suits, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1988, at 1,
col. 1. In Patterson, O'Connor was a member of the slim majority that, although preserving
Congressional power in theory, "scrapp[ed] a legal weapon successfully used in more than
100 cases to fight alleged discrimination by private schools, private employers, and others."
Epstein, supra note 1, at GI, col. 3. Additionally, although the cases are arguably distin-
guishable, it is interesting to note that Stewart joined the five-member majority to overturn
a conviction in the Supreme Court's original flag burmng case of Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576 (1969), while O'Connor joined the dissenters supporting criminal convictions for
flag burmng in the later cases of Tdxas v. Johnson, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989)
and United States v. Eichman, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
4 For example, Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion in Fullilove v. Klutzmck, 448
U.S. 448 (1980), endorsing a Congressional affirmative action statute that required a
percentage of federal contract funds to be directed to businesses owned by members of
specified ethnic minority groups. By contrast, Justice Scalia is one of the Court's most
outspoken critics of affirmative action, see Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
147, and he dissented in the Court's later decision supporting an affirmnative action program
mandated by Congress in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
- U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). Chief Justice Burger authored the employment
discrimination decision which declared that Congress sought to eradicate "the consequences
of [discriminatory] employment practices, not simply the motivation," Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971) (emphasis in original), while Scalia was a member of
the five-member majority that backed away from the well-established Griggs precedent. See
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atomo, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). Throughout his
judicial career, Scalia has sought to require discrimination victims to undertake the difficult
task of proving discriminatory intent rather than merely showing discriminatory conse-
quences. See King, Justice Antonin Scalia: The First Term on the Supreme Court-1986-
1987, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 36-38 (1988). Although Chief Justice Burger was a member of
the majority supporting a right to abortion in Roe, Justice Scalia has actively advocated
that Roe be reversed immediately. See Webster, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
I Although Justice Powell was a member of the majority in Roe and subsequently
issued a plea for the preservation of the abortion decision in deference to the doctrine of
stare decists, City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 421 n.1, Justice Kennedy joined the plurality
opinion in Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056, which advocated reconsideration of Roe. Justice
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appointee, David Souter, to replace Justice Brennan continues
the "conservatization" process and potentially may lead to dra-
matic changes in the Court's decisions affecting abortion, affir-
mative action, criminal defendants' rights, religious freedom, and
other issues.
When there are personnel changes m the other institutions of
American government, such as the election of a new president or
new members of Congress, the public expects new decisions and
policies, especially when the newcomers are from a different polit-
ical party than their predecessors. 6 These new decisions will stem
from the policy preferences and partisan interests of the political
actors elected to office. Because these decision makers are account-
able to the public through the electoral process, voters can judge
the new decisions and policies (or lack thereof) and change the
governing institution again at the next election if they are dissat-
isfied.
By contrast, the Supreme Court portrays itself as a legal, rather
than a political, institution.7 As such, the Court's decisions pre-
sumably are made through the application of reasoned legal prm-
Powell crafted the compromise opinmon endorsing affirmative action programs in Regents
of the Umv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), while Justice Kennedy has actively
opposed the continuation of affirmative action by joimng the five-member majority that
struck down the City of Richmond's minority contract program in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and by dissenting vigorously against the continuation
of the Federal Commumcation Commission's affirmative action policies in Metro Broad-
casting Inc., 110 S. Ct. at 3044.
6 Tlus admittedly simplistic characterization describes the ideal of the American
govermng system, in which citizens can make choices about preferred leaders and public
policies m the voting booth by casting ballots for candidates from the political party offering
the most persuasive program. As some political scientists have noted, "[political p]arties
are the central intermediary in making mass democracy operational." R. KOLBE, AMEICAN
POLITICAL PARTIEs 3 (1985). In actuality, the party system operates in an imperfect manner
because of various structures within the political system and because some political interests
control a disproportionate share of resources. See H. RErrR, PARTIES AND ELCTcIONS IN
CORPORATE AMERICA 64-69 (1987).
The Supreme Court is obviously a political institution in a number of respects: its
composition is determined by the election of particular presidents who will appoint new
justices, its decisions affect controversial public policies, such as abortion, affirmative action,
and pornography, and its decisions elicit responses from other political institutions, such as
the Flag Protection Act of 1989 and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, which were enacted by
Congress to counteract Supreme Court decisions affecting flag burning and civil rights,
respectively. See S. GOLDMAN & T. JAINIGE, Tim FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM
39-59, 206-233 (3d ed. 1985). However, life tenure and protected salbaries for the justices
insulate the Court from political influences. See U.S. CONST..art. III, sec. 1. The Court's
utilization of black robes, rigidly formal procedures, and other accoutrements of judicial
office give it an aura of neutrality and detachment intended to preserve the Supreme Court's
unique status as the institution governed by law rather than politics.
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ciples instead of naked policy preferences and partisan interests.
Theoretically, if legal principles guide decision making, then a
change in personnel should not cause abrupt shifts in the devel-
opment of constitutional law
The Supreme Court's status as a legal institution reinforces the
image of law as neutral and objective.8 The Court seeks to preserve
its role and image as the country's leading legal institution because,
given its removal from direct electoral accountability, to behave
otherwise would lead to overt clashes with popular notions about
democratic government. 9 Upon close exanunation it is obvious that,
contrary to the imagery of stable, slowly evolving legal principles
determimng legal decisions, case holdings can be dramatically af-
fected by changes in the Court's composition. Within specific cases,
it is easy to see how the competing policy preferences of liberal
and conservative justices are manifested m their opimons.' 0 Overall,
however, justices approach their decisions differently from actors
within the other branches of government.
Although the justices' values and policy preferences affect their
decisions, the Supreme Court's decision making process is cloaked
in legal procedures that permit considered judgments and careful
explanations of underlying justifications. According to one study,
"[t]he institution perceived [by the public] to make decisions most
fairly is the United States Supreme Court, in part because it makes
8
With symbols such as law degrees, robes, walnut-paneled courtrooms, elevated
benches, a special language, and the like, we help sustain the myth of an
impersonal judiciary divining decisions based on some objective truth con-
tained in the Constitution (another symbol), and knowable only by a select
few. It is all a very reassuring view of policy-making (or rather, rule divining),
for after the tumult, greed, and indecisiveness of the legislative process-not
to mention the excesses, embarrassments and dissonance of the executive policy
process-we quickly weary of the frustrations and disappointments of plain
old POLITICS and wish to repair to the serenity, the sureness, indeed the
utter sublimity of JUSTICE, which the LAW and its purveyors promise.
H. STuMF, AMERICAN JuDIciAL PoLrrIcs 42 (1988).
9 As commentators have observed, "[b]ecause courts, especially the nonelected federal
courts, are not democratic institutions, they must not lightly substitute their own values
and judgments for those of elected legislatures and executives. The legitimacy of courts
rests in their fidelity to the law and its enforcement." J. GROSSMAN & R. WELLS, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 11 (3d ed. 1988).
10 See Smith, Bright-Line Rules and the Supreme Court: The Tension Between Clarity
in Legal Doctrine and Justices' Policy Preferences, 16 Omo N.U.L. REv 119 (1990)
(examples of decisions manifesting justices' policy preferences).
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decisions on the basis of full information."' As described by one
long-time observer of the Supreme Court, the Court's image and
legitimacy as a legal institution are to some extent deserved:
[P]ublic respect for the [Clourt-based partly on ignorance and
partly on myth-is fundamentally well-placed. The justices' con-
stitutional interpretations owe more to political ideologies than
they pretend. But far more than the Congress, far more than any
recent president, justices reach decisions by searching their con-
sciences, carefully sifting facts and law, trying to do right as they
see the right.' 2
The introduction of increasingly conservative Reagan-appoint-
ees onto the Supreme Court during the 1980s initiated the process
of moving constitutional law in new directions. These changes have
attracted significant attention from the national news media 3 and
have raised questions about potential future developments affecting
the Supreme Court's role and actions. What will happen to the
Supreme Court's legitimacy as the nation's leading legal institution
during the current transitional era? In particular, how will the
Supreme Court be affected by Justice Brennan's retirement? Be-
cause of his "intellectual force [and] magnetic personality,'1 4 Justice
Brennan was characterized as a "center of gravity" on the Court.' 5
If Brennan's departure rapidly accelerates the pace of doctrinal
changes and alters the justices' interactive decision making proc-
esses, will the Supreme Court's public image be affected? These
are lingering questions with significant implications for the future
of constitutional law and the Supreme Court's role in the American
system. Although most -published commentaries on the Court's
transitional era discuss developments in specific substantive areas
of law,' 6 the era's effects upon the Court's institutional image and
,1 Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice,
and Political Tolerance, 23 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 469, 484 (1989).
n Taylor, Season of Snarling Justices, Akron Beacon J., Apr. 5, 1990, at All, col.
1.
13 See, Lacayo, Is the Court Turning Right?, Time, Oct. 24, 1988, at 78; McDamel,
supra note 1, at 16; McDamel, Judicial Flash Points, Newsweek, July 30, 1990, at 18-19;
Kamen, A Shift in Balance: New President Will Shape Court's Future, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Oct. 2, 1988, at IC, col. 1.
14Greenhouse, An Activist's Legacy, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1990, at 1, 22, col. 3.
" Id.
16 See, e.g., Hoffmann, The Supreme Court's New Vision of Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 165 (changes in contemporary Court's view of
habeas corpus claims); Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE
1990-91]
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role also deserve careful attention. In the sections that follow, this
Article analyzes the consequences of the developments affecting
the Supreme Court and discusses how contemporary changes could
affect the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Court as a judicial
institution.
Part I of this Article addresses the importance' of legitimacy to
the Supreme Court's power and authority 17 After establishing the
function of interpersonal relationships in the Court's decision mak-
ing process, Part II discusses how verbal jousting and a loss of
respect among the justices might affect the Court's perceived legit-
imacy as a legal institution. 8 Part III continues the discussion of
legitimacy in terms of the emerging majority's- refusal to follow
precedent.' 9 Part IV concludes the examination of legitimacy by
discussing the Court's markedly partisan composition. 0
I. THn SUPREME COURT AND LEGITIMACY
A promnent concept in assessing modern political institutions
is "legitimacy " Political legitimacy has been described as "the
quality of 'oughtness' that is perceived by the public to inhere in
a political regime. ' ' 2' The concept of legitimacy refers to the publ-
ic's acceptance of and obedience to a governing institution's actions
as appropriate and proper within the established political system,
even when people personally disagree with specific decisions.2 The
legitimacy of governing institutions is important for two reasons.
First, governing institutions need legitimacy in order to perform
their societal functions. A lack of public support and acceptance
can prevent an institution from performing its assigned tasks ef-
fectively = Because the Supreme Court has a limited ability to
enforce its decisions, a loss of legitimacy could hinder the nuple-
L.J. 1297 (1990) (analysis of emerging constitutional theory with special attention to criminal
cases); Rohde & Spaeth, Ideology, Strategy and Supreme Court Decisions: William Rehn-
quist as Chief Justice, 72 JrDIcATUPE 247 (1989) (study finding Chief Justice Rehnquist's
decisions on substantive issues consistent with decisions earlier in his career).
17 See infra notes 21-43 and accompanying text.
Is See infra notes 44-87 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 88-130 and accompanying text.
- See infra notes 131-45 and accompanying text.
21 Merelman, Learning and Legitimacy, 60 AM. PoL. Sc. Rnv. 548, 548 (1966).
12 C. BLACK, THm PEoPLE AND THE COURT 35 (1960).
23 Jaros & Roper, The U.S. Supreme Court: Myth, Diffuse Support, Specific Support,
and Legitimacy, 8 AM. PoL. Q. 85, 85 (1980).
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mentation and acceptance of judicial decisions32 Second, "there
may be a relation between the legitimacy of an entire regime and
that of its constituent operating institutions." Any loss of stature
as a judicial institution by the Supreme Court may have corre-
sponding detrimental effects for the govermng system as a whole.
26
The concept of legitimacy, as described here in relation to the
Supreme Court, often is criticized as unproven and of doubtful
validity 27 Indeed, there is evidence that the public is unaware of
the details of the Supreme Court's role and specific actions.2 At
a general level, however, research on public perceptions provides
"some evidence that the legitimacy of the [Supreme] Court, at least
as reflected in diffuse levels of support, affects compliance with
unpopular decisions." 29 Perhaps the Supreme Court would be more
effective if the public viewed the Court as motivated by partisan
interests, like any other political institution, rather than as guided
by the principles of law This proposition will never be thoroughly
tested, however, because the public, politicians, and the justices
themselves continue to regard the Court as a legal institution that
is distinctively different from other governing institutions within
the political system. Whether or not the concept of the Supreme
Court's legitimacy has empirical validity, it is "real" and important
2 The Supreme Court depends on other political actors to accept and enforce its
decisions. See C. JoHNsoN & B. CANON, JuDICLk PoLIcms: ImPLEmENTATIoN AND IMPACT
77-103 (1984). In the 1950's, for example, many Southern school districts actively resisted
the Court's desegregation order in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The
Court had to rely upon lower federal courts to apply its decision in individual cities and
upon Executive Branch officials to enforce the judicial decisions, as when President Eisen-
hower used military troops to implement desegregation at Little Rock Central High School.
See R. KLUGER, SiMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BoARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRuGcLE FOR EQUA=ITy 752-754 (1975). Resistance by the public and
other political actors, including the Executive Branch, may increase if the Supreme Court's
stature as a legitimate judicial institution is tarmshed. In the 1830s, the State of Georgia
ignored a Supreme Court order to protect land belonging to the Cherokee people. President
Andrew Jackson declined to enforce the decision. The consequences of this episode, as
described by one historian, illustrate the tragic results when the Supreme Court's relative
weakness is revealed: "All the states supported Georgia's flouting of the Supreme Court,
as well as Jackson's policy, to force the tribes, against their will, to give up fertile lands
that they had inhabited for centuries to move to the barren reaches of the Great Plains."
M. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LmERTY: A CoNsTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
271-73 (1988).
25 Jaros & Roper, supra note 23, at 85.
2 See C. BLACK, supra note 22, at 52-53.
17 See Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wisc. L.
REv. 379.
n Id. at 408-12.
2 Gibson, supra note I1, at 489.
1990-91]
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because so many political actors believe in and seek to preserve the
Court's image as a legal institution.
Why was there such a controversy about whether or not sena-
tors should ask President Bush's Supreme Court nominee, David
Souter, directly about his views on abortion and other controversial
subjects? As one news article described the issue: "There is nothing
in law to prevent a senator from simply asking a Supreme Court
nominee what [he or she] thinks. But modern tradition calls for a
measure of tact that is at least partly rooted in the fear that direct
questiomng on hot-button issues could impinge on the concept of
an independent judiciary" (emphasis added).30 In reality, after
confirmation, a federal judge is free to put forth nearly any views
in legal opimons. 31 Thus, by posing such questions, the senators
do not seriously affect judicial independence. The dispute about
questiomng judicial nominees actually demonstrates a widespread,
deep-seated desire to maintain a belief in the neutrality of judicial
officers and to preserve the "concept" of the Supreme Court's
status as a legal institution. If nominees responded to senators'
specific queries with complete answers, then it might be more
difficult to maintain the justices' image as decision makers who
follow legal principles instead of personal viewpoints.
As described by scholars, the "Model of Law" applied to the
Supreme Court seeks to avoid the political contamination, or harm
to the Court's legitimacy, that would follow if the Supreme Court
were viewed as a political institution:
[The Model of Law] emphasizes the differences between law and
politics and the relative autonomy of law The difference can
be appreciated best as a distinction in the justification of legal
and political decisions. The pnmary and proper justification of
legal decisions, so the argument goes, is one of procedure and
Morganthau, Cohn, DeFrank, McDamel, Wright & King, Popping the Question:
Both Sides in the Abortion War Want Answers, Newsweek, Aug. 6, 1990, at 17, 18
[hereinafter Morganthau].
11 Federal judicial officers are free to behave independently and express their views in
their opinions. For example, an Alabama district judge attempted to undo Supreme Court
precedents that prohibited organized prayer in public schools. His conservative supporters
"treated [his] 'startling' conclusions as belated advances in legal reasomng rather than as
judgments flying brazenly in the face of tlurty-five years of constitutional law." L. CAPLAN,
TiHE TENh JUSTICE 98-99 (1987). The Supreme Court brought the judge back into line by
reversing his decision in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). The judge's rebellion had
no effect upon his continued position and authority as a distnct judge. Thus, independent
lower court judges may find their free-thnking opimons reversed on appeal. Such an intra-
judicial constraint on lower court judges does not detract from the independence of the
judiciary as a whole.
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method, of means and not ends. The strength, and ultimately the
legitimacy, of law and the courts lies in the establishment and
application of fair predictable procedures, not in producing any
particular result. Law is the application of principles to the so-
lution of human problems, and it is only when judges objectively
apply "neutral" principles that they are acting as judges whose
decisions are entitled to legitimacy and respect. 32
Although social scientists who study judicial decision making can
identify patterns of values, personal experiences, and interests asso-
ciated with particular court decisions,33 lawyers and legal scholars
preserve the image of law and judicial institutions by analyzing legal
principles rather than the actual decision making processes under-
taken by judges. 4 Judge Robert Bork's attacks on his critics focus
on their "political" approach to law 35 Bork's critics duck the "pol-
itics" accusation by claimng that the substantive content of his legal
theories led to the defeat of his nomination to the Supreme Court.3 6
By avoiding the association of "politics" with "law," the image and
legitimacy of judicial institutions is protected against a major under-
lying risk: "If courts do not preserve their distinctiveness from other
political bodies, if they cease being 'courts,' then their claim to
legitimacy-and their power-will erode." ' 37
Both liberal and conservative justices have expressed concern
about the Supreme Court's image and legitimacy.38 Justice Felix
32 J. GRossmAN & R. WELLS, supra note 9, at 11.
3 See, e.g., Tate, Personal Attribute Models of Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economic Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM.
POL. Sci. REV 355 (1981) (factors such as justices' party identification and prior prosecu-
tonal experience associated with particular kinds of judicial decisions). A comprehensive
review of studies of judicial decision making found that "judges' decisions are a function
of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but constrained
by what they perceive is feasible to do." Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The
Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior, 5 PoL. BEHaAv 7, 9 (1983).
34 See, e.g., Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S.
Constitution, 18 CoNN. L. REv. 739 (1986) (comparison of equal protection and free
expression pnnciples with legal principles applied in freedom of religion cases); Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 IAv L. Rav. 1 (1959) (application
of "neutral" legal principles in constitutional interpretation).
31 See Bork, The Case Against Political Judging, NAT'L Rav., Dec. 1989, at 23; Bork,
The Inherent Illegitimacy of Noninterpretivism, in PoLIcs AND Tma CoNsrrrTlMoN Il
(1990).
36 Pertschuk & Schaetzel, The Remaking of Robert Bork, 249 Tim NATON 750, 751
(1989).
31 J. GRossiwN & R. WEr.s, supra note 9, at 11.
3' Not all of the justices share the same level of concern about maintaimng the
Supreme Court's image as a legal rather than a political institution. Although Justice
1990-91]
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Frankfurter wrote that "[tihe [Supreme] Court's authority-pos-
sessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sus-
tained public confidence in its moral sanction. ' 39 More recently,
Justice Blackmun reiterated the concern that the Supreme Court
should avoid any action that might "undermine[] public confidence
in the disinterestedness of the Judicial Branch.'"'4 Blackmun explicitly
expressed Ins belief m the Importance of the Supreme Court's image
and legitimacy by saying that "[tihe legitimacy of the Judicial Branch
ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonparti-
sanship.1 41 Consistent with these sentiments is Justice Scalia's fear
that the Supreme Court will be regarded as a political rather than a
legal institution, giving rise to a loss of legitimacy 42
Although critics may be correct in asserting that there is little
proof that the concept of "legitimacy" enhances the Supreme Court's
functions,43 the Court's image is obviously important to justices,
scholars, politicians, journalists, and the public. Because this concern,
whether justified or not, manifests itself in Supreme Court opinions,
politicians' assessments of judicial nominees, and news media de-
scriptions of judicial institutions, it is important to assess how the
Court's legitimacy and image may be affected by the changes occur-
ring in the current transitional era.
II. T~m JUSTICES' INTERACTIONS WrrmN THE COURT
A. Judicial Decision Making and Interpersonal Relations
The personalities and interactions of the justices have, in the
O'Connor was embarrassed when a letter she wrote was used by conservative Arizona
Republicans to support their claim that the United States is a "Chnstian nation," A Private
Opinion, Time, Mar. 27, 1989, at 45, Justice Marshall apparently feels no inhibitions about
bluntly criticizing Presidents Reagan and Bush and subsequently serving as a target for
condemnation by offended politicians and commentators. See Marshall: Speaking Ill of the
Dead, Newsweek, Aug. 6, 1990, at 18.
11 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
40 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S..361, 405-409, 109 S. Ct. 647, 672-73 (1989).
" Id.
42 In complaimng that his colleagues did not forthrightly address the issue of abortion,
Scalia asserted that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), should be reversed in order to avoid
tarnishing the Court's image: "Alone sufficient to justify a broad holding is the fact that
our retatnng control, through Roe, of what I believe to be, and many of our citizens
recognize to be, a political issue, continuously distorts the public perception of the role of
this Court." Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, -U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 3040,
3065 (1989) (Scalia, J., concumng).
41 See Hyde, supra note 27, at 389-400.
[VOL. 79
SUPREME COURT LEGITIMACY
words of one scholar, "considerable effect on some decisions." 44 By
utilizing the private papers of former justices, social scientists have
shown that the justices influence each other through persuasion,
bargaining, and other tactics involving interpersonal relationships. 45
Relationships and interactions within the Court are part of what has
been characterized as "a critical group element [in] the [Supreme]
Court's decision makmg" 46
Part of the decisional process occurs in the group settings of oral
argument and the Court's conferences. Further, justices have
incentives to interact and work together on decisions outside of
conference. The shared goal of seeking majority approval for an
opimon in each case often requires interaction. The desire to
obtain as much consensus as possible gives justices further reason
to work together to reach agreement on outcomes and opi-
mons.
Group interaction also accounts for the shifting of indi-
vidual votes and collective decisions after tentative decisions in
conference. A justice may change a position independently after
further study of a case, but frequently it is input from colleagues
that spurs reconsideration of an initial position.4 7
The Court's decision-making processes will be altered with the
departure of Justice Brennan. Within the interactive process of
Supreme Court decision making, Justice Brennan has been called
"the best coalition builder ever to sit on the Supreme Court. '48
Because Brennan could be "irresistibly persuasive," 49 " [t] erm after
term, he demonstrated his ability to score the unexpected victory
or at least to shape outcomes that he no longer had the votes to
control." 50 With Brennan's departure, the dynamics of the Court's
internal processes and interpersonal relationships will change, and
those changes will affect the Court's decisions. Although the ulti-
"L. BAUM, TirE SuPREME COURT 149 (3d ed. 1989).
"See W MuRPHY, EiEmErs oF JuDicIL STRATEGY 37-90 (1964).
46 L. BAtm, supra note 44, at 149.
47 Id.
41 Id. at 152 (quoting Serrill, The Power of William Brennan, Time, July 22, 1985,
at 62).
41 Denmston, Artful Persuasion Brought Victories, Akron Beacon J., July 22, 1990,
at Al, A8, col. 4.
" Greenhouse, supra note 14, at 1, 22, col. 3.
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mate consequences of the changes affecting the Supreme Court are
uncertain, it is clear that the nation's highest court is in a transi-
tional era in which the recent influx of new justices will alter the
previously established patterns of case decisions and judicially in-
fluenced public policies.
1. Interpersonal Relations in Supreme Court History
In previous eras, the dynamics of the Supreme Court's decision-
making processes have been affected by conflicts between individ-
ual justices. During the 1920's and 1930's, Justice James Mc-
Reynolds demonstrated his extreme anti-Semitism by leaving the
room whenever Justice Louis Brandeis, the first Jewish justice,
spoke during conference. 51 McReynolds alienated his colleagues and
undercut his potential influence within the Court by responding to
his colleagues' draft opimons with such comments as "[tihis state-
ment makes me sick." '5 2 McReynolds' behavior graphically illus-
trates one scholar's observation that "Supreme Court justices, like
other people, vary in their likeability and their skills in personal
relations, and these characteristics inevitably will affect their influ-
ence."
53
Although there are other examples of justices' personality traits
and interpersonal conflicts affecting interactions within the Su-
preme Court, most notably the feud between Justices Hugo Black
and Robert Jackson in the 1940's and 1950's, 5 4 and the alienation
of the professorial Justice Frankfurter from his colleagues during
the same era,55 the contemporary Supreme Court has entered a
1, D. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SuPREME COURT IN AMERICAN PoLmCS 281 (2d
ed. 1990).
52 L. BAUM, supra note 44, at 151.
53 Id.
' Justices Jackson and Black, along with other justices, argued about Black's failure
to disqualify himself from consideration of a case being argued by Black's former law
partner. Disputes continued over other matters, and the Black-Jackson feud may have
prevented Jackson from being named Chief Justice to succeed Harlan Stone in 1946. W
REHNQUIST, THE SuPnREm COuRT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 65-68 (1987). As described by
one scholar, "Hugo Black and Robert Jackson engaged in an open feud, and the papers
of the Court's justices depict bitterness and distrust between other pairs of justices." L.
BAUm, supra note 44, at 156.
5 In his memoirs, Justice William 0. Douglas was very critical of his colleague, Felix
Frankfurter:
He was primarily a teacher, and the habits he had acquired in that role carried
over into all subsequent ones. Whenever a new Justice appeared at the Supreme
Court, Frankfurter seemed to spend extra time and energy converting him to
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new phase in making its conflicts visible to the public. One long-
time observer of the Supreme Court characterized the contempo-
rary era as the "season of snarling justices' 5 6 because. the justices
seem to be establishing a new norm for attacking each other
publicly in their published opinions.
2. Manifestations of Conflict in Contemporary Opinions
In most Supreme Court opinions, justices criticize the reasoning
and results advocated by colleagues with whom they disagree. Prior
to the acceleration of new appointments to the Supreme Court in
the late 1980's, there were instances of dissenting opinions aiming
barbed comments at the views of other justices.57 With the addition
of Justices Scalia and Kennedy, and the concomitant shift in de-
cisions affecting a variety of substantive areas in constitutional
a particular school of thought that Frankfurter preferred. He was indeed a
proselytizer extraordinary.
.He was, as I have said, a proselytizer, and every waking hour vig-
orously promoted the ideas he espoused. Up and down the halls he went,
pleading, needling, nudging, probing. He never stopped trying to change the
votes on a case until the decision came down.
Frankfurter also engaged in histnomcs in Conference. He often came in
with piles of books, and on his turn to talk, would pound the table, read
from the books, throw them around and create a great disturbance. At
times, when another [justice] was talking, he would break in, make a derisive
comment and shout down the speaker.
[Justice Frank] Murphy was a special target of Frankfurter, who made
fun of him behind his back. Murphy had a disease that caused poor blood
circulation in his extremities. So he spent the hours in Conference rubbing his
hands, massaging his fingers, and the like. Frankfurter pilloried Murphy for
the habit, whispering that Murphy was so distraught that he was trying to
solve legal problems by wringing his hands.
W DouGLAS, TBE COURT YEAas: 1939-1975, 21-25 (1980).
" Taylor, supra note 12, at All, col. 1.
" In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), Justice Brennan chastized Chief Justice
Burger for completely ignonng the test for establishment clause violations that he had
created in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), in order to uphold prayer in the
Nebraska state legislature. Brennan wrote, "I have no doubt that, if any group of law
students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer,
they would nearly unammously find the practice to be unconstitutional." Id. at 800 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). In United States Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), Justice
Rehnquist believed that the majority deviated from the purposes of anti-discrimination
statutes by approving an affirmative action program. He wrote, "[t]hus, by a tour de force
rermscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes, and Hughes, but of escape artists such as
Houdim, the Court eludes clear statutory language. " Id. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
law, there has been a discernible increase in the frequency and
stridency of opinions attacking other justices. The harsh tone of
many contemporary opimons is attributable to the personality traits
of the justices, the evolving norm of combative attacks upon
opponents, and the deep disagreements between justices concerning
recurring controversial issues. 51
In Webster v Reproductive Health Services,5 9 Justice Scalia
condemned both his allies and opponents for not forthrightly re-
moving the Supreme Court from involvement in the abortion issue.
He noted sarcastically that the reasoning in Chief Justice Rehn-
qtust's opinion, which permits greater state regulation of abor-
tions-the result supported by Scalia-"will doubtless be heralded
as a triumph of judicial statesmanship"0 despite the fact that the
Supreme Court's involvement in the abortion issue "continuously
distorts the public perception of the role of this Court. ' 61 Although
the other justices who are inclined to join Scalia in overturmng
Roe v Wade indicated that they would wait patiently until Justice
O'Connor is willing to provide the needed fifth vote for reversal, 62
Justice Scalia said that O'Connor's arguments "cannot be taken
seriously' 63 and pointedly highlighted inconsistencies in O'Con-
nor's previous decisions. 4
In other opinions, Scalia utilized strident, cataclysnic warnings
to condemn his colleagues for not adhering to his vision of sepa-
ration of powers and judicial restraint. When his colleagues en-
dorsed the use of independent counsels for the investigation of
rmsconduct in the Executive Branch, Scalia's solitary dissent ex-
" In addition to disagreements about controversial substantive issues, new battles are
developing among the justices over the proper method for interpreting statutes. Justice
Scalia places relatively little weight upon legislative history. The justices' continued use of
legislative history in some cases has exacerbated conflicts. According to one scholar, "there
are still cases every Term in which the Court uses legislative history to massage a better
result out of a statute whose plain meamng seems unreasonable. These cases have sometimes
provoked sharp exchanges on the Court, however." Eskndge, The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REv. 621, 659 (1990).
59 - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
60 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064
(Scalia, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 3065.
6Although he wrote an opimon criticizing the entire basis for the majority opimon
in Roe v. Wade, Chief Justice Rehnquist stopped short of advocating reversal and claimed
to agree with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the Webster case did not call Roe into
question. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3045.
Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring).
6 Id.
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coriated the majority's reasomng for its "utter incompatibility
with our constitutional traditions"65 and predicted that the Court's
decision would do "great harm" to the country 6 In another solo
dissent, he predicted that the Court's approval of the inter-branch
Sentencing Commission "will be disastrous" for the country 67
Scalia's harshest criticism of his colleagues came in the "right to
die" case, where he warned that, by continuing the judiciary's
involvement in controversial moral issues, the other eight justices
might lead the Court to "destroy itself. '68
In a split decision concermng the permissibility of religious
holiday displays in public buildings, Justices Blackmun and Ken-
nedy blatantly mnuicked each other's criticisms. Although admit-
ting his characterization to be "uncharitable, ' 69 Justice Kennedy
described Justice Blackmun's test as "using little more than intui-
tion and a tape measure." 70 Blackmun shot back that "[i]f one
wished to be 'uncharitable' to Justice Kennedy, one could say that
his methodology requires counting the number of days during
which the government displays Christian symbols and subtracting
from this the number of days during which non-Christian symbols
are displayed.. "71 Kennedy concluded that Blackmun and the
majority had undertaken "an Orwellian rewriting of history as
many understand it," and that "I can conceive of no judicial
function more antithetical to the First Amendment." 72 Blackmun
countered that Kennedy's reading of precedents "would gut the
core of the Establishment Clause. ' 73 Moreover, Blackmun asserted
that Kennedy "msperceived" the Constitution's mandate of re-
spect for religious pluralism and that "[1]o misperception could be
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 659, 709 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 733.
6 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 647, 683 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Scalia issued a similar warning in a split decision in which the majority found
that political patronage violated the constitutional rights of individuals who lost jobs because
they were not affiliated with the political party in power. According to Scalia, the decision
"may well have disastrous consequences for our political system." Rutan v. Republican
Party of Ill., U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2747 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Cruzan v. Missouri, -U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2863 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
19 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, -U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3144 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
70 Id. at 3144-45.
11 Id. at 3108.
72 Id. at 3146 (Kennedy, J., concurmng m the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
73 Id. at 3106.
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more antithetical to the values embodied in the Establishment
Clause." 74 Blackmun also reacted to Kennedy's criticisms of the
majority's supposed hostility to religion as if they were personal
affronts: "[N]otlung could be further from the truth, and the
accusations could be said to be as offensive as they are absurd. '75
Justice Blackmun had never been noted for combative or sting-
ing opimons. However, in 1989 the deep schism within the Court
over issues of discrimination was illuminated by Blackmun's poign-
ant criticism of his colleagues in the emerging conservative majority
for their insensitivity to racial discrimination: "Sadly, this [con-
struction of an employment discrimination statute] comes as no
surprise. One wonders whether the majority still believes that race
discrinmnation-or, more accurately, race discrimnation against
nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it
ever was."
' 76
This sharp attack on the new majority may have struck a nerve.
The following year Justice Scalia counterattacked with the accu-
sation that the Court's liberals are overly sensitive to issues of
racial discrimination. In a case alleging racial discnmination in the
selection of a jury, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority- "Justice
Marshall's dissent rolls out the ultimate weapon, the accusation of
insensitivity to racial discrimination-which will lose its intimidat-
ing effect if it continues to be fired so randomly '77 Scalia's
sarcastic statement implies that the liberal justices have been im-
properly cowed by unjustified concerns for racial discrimination.
This was a damning broadside equal to Blackmun's condemnation
of the conservatives' insensitivity 78
14 Id. at 3110.
75 Id.
16 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atomo, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2136 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" Holland v. Illinois, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 803, 810 (1990).
78 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall responded to Justice Scalia's attack by
accusing the majority of having "selective amnesia" about relevant case precedents. Id. at
818 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall also addressed Scalia's specific accusation by as-
serting that it demonstrated that the majority has little understanding of racial discrimination
cases concerning juries:
The majonty considers "random[]" my suggestion that its opinion today
signals a retreat from our previous efforts to eradicate racial discrimina-
tion. Our cases have repeatedly used the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-
section requirement as a weapon to combat racial discrimination. Yet
today, the majority says that the Sixth Amendment is no more concerned with
discrimination against Afro-Amencans than it is with discrimination against
"postmen." The majority concludes that "[r]ace as such has nothing to
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3. The Risks of Verbal Jousting
By attacking each other openly and personally in their pub-
lished opinions, the justices potentially threaten the Supreme Court's
image and legitimacy as a legal institution. Attention-grabbing
disagreements among the justices can cast doubt on the general
belief that the Supreme Court is following established legal pnn-
ciples. Thus, the justices normally take care to use their written
opinions to develop elaborate explanations and rationalizations for
their interpretations of the Constitution and challenged statutes.
As described by one scholar,
The function of an opimon is to persuade people outside the
Court-first, the parties to the case, and then others, the legal
community and other "court-watchers"-that the decision is a
reasonable one, reasonably arrived at, with sufficient guidance in
the court's opimon to allow those affected to control "primary
conduct.' 79
Opinions containing open, personal attacks on fellow justices can
harm the Court's image by magnifying perceptions that personal
or ideological disputes, rather than legal principles, determine the
justices' interpretations of constitutional law As one observer warns,
[There is still a serious cost to public brawling on the bench:
The more the justices question each other's basic common sense
and good faith, the more they may deplete the reservoir of
popular good will that is so essential to their singular role in
American life. They might eventually find their rulings dismissed
as the work of unelected, unprincipled politicians. 0
B. Additional Manifestations of Interpersonal Conflict
Conflicts between justices are detectable beyond the public
attacks that appear in the Court's published opinions. For example,
Justice White has expressed his dismay that his colleagues are
do with the legal issue in this case." I read these statements as a retreat;
that the majority has so little understanding of our Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence that it considers that criticism "randomi]" is, if anything, proof
that it is right on the mark [to label this a retreat].
Id. at 819-20 n.2.
"S. WASBY, THE SuPRaas CouRT iN Tim FEmDER JuDictAL SYSTEM 263 (1988).
- Taylor, supra note 12, at All.
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willing to hear fewer and fewer cases each year.81 White has dis-
sented nearly seventy times from-decisions not to review cases.8 2
Such disagreements about the Supreme Court's proper role in
accepting cases for consideration could exacerbate conflicts among
the justices.
Oral argument provides another forum in which conflicts be-
tween justices can be manifested and exacerbated. News reports
characterized Justices O'Connor and Scalia as "sparring" during
oral arguments in the 1989 term abortion cases.83 Some have raised
concerns that Justice Scalia's aggressive behavior during oral ar-
guments causes friction with other justices. Justice Blackmun re-
vealed in a speech that,
[Justice Scalia] is and always will be the professor at work.
He asks far too many questions, and he takes over the whole
argument of the counsel, he will argue with counsel. Even
[Justice O'Connor], who asks a lot of questions, a couple of
times gets exasperated when [Scalia] interrupts her line of inquiry
and goes off on Is own. She throws her pencil and [saysl "umh,
umh."
On at least one occasion, Chief Justice Rehnquist had to interrupt
oral argument to prevent Scalia from absorbing the entire allotted
time period: during Scalia's lengthy questioning of an attorney,
Rehnquist finally interrupted to tell the attorney, "[y]ou have
fifteen minutes remaining. I hope when you're' given the opportu-
nity to do so, you'll address some of your remarks to the question
on which the Court voted to grant certiorari."8 5
Although conflicts during oral arguments and disputes over
granting certiorari are less visible to the public,8 6 such conflicts
81 During the 1989 term, the justices heard fifteen percent fewer cases than the
preceding term. Kaplan & McDamel, No Heavy Lifting at the High Court, Newsweek, Feb.
5, 1990, at 63. Tius pattern of being increasingly restrictive regarding the number of cases
accepted for hearing comports with Justice Scalia's view that the federal courts should limit
significantly the number and kinds of cases accepted for adjudication. See Hengstler, Scalia
Seeks Court Changes, 73 A.B.A. J., April 1, 1987, at 20.
81 Biskupic, Justices Show A Propensity for Letting Others Decide, 48 CONG. Q. 2130,
2131 (1990).
Abortion: Sparring on the Bench, Newsweek, Dec. 11, 1989, at 49.
84 Taylor, On a Justice's Scale, Colleagues Are Sometimes Weighty, N. Y. Times,
July 25, 1988, at B6, col. 2, 3. One scholar who spent a year working at the Supreme Court
indicates that the justices often are irritated by Scalia's outspokenness. D. O'BRaN, supra
note 51, at 274.
" D. O'BRaN, supra note 51, at 274.
" The relative invisibility of all aspects of Supreme Court justices' behavior, except
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may attract the attention of the news media or encourage further
interpersonal attacks in published opimons, thereby harming the
Court's image and legitimacy 87
III. Stare Decisis and Legitimacy
The principle of stare decisis, or adherence to case precedent,
has been described as "firmly rooted in [American] jurispru-
dence. ' 8 8 The use of previous judicial decisions as precedents pro-
vides stability and predictability 89 Justice Kennedy described the
supreme importance of stare decisis:
The [Supreme] Court has said often and with great emphasis
that "the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance
to the rule of law " (citation omitted) [I]t is indisputable
that stare decisis is a basic self-governing pnnciple within the
Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult
task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is
not based upon "an arbitrary discretion." 9
for published opinons, is illustrated by Chief Justice Rehnquist's description of Justice
Jackson's battle with Justice Black in the 1940s. When Jackson and other justices objected
to Black's participation in a decision involving a case presented by Black's former law
partner, the "rift among the justices received no public attention at the time because the
action on the petition for rehearing was buried in a long list of orders and a number of
opinions were announced the same day." W REHNQuiST, supra note 54, at 66.
8 It is possible, of course, that the justices are unaffected by the personal attacks in
published opinons and the frictions that arise in their daily interactions. For example,
according to one anecdote recounted by a former law clerk, Justice O'Connor is unaffected
by Justice Scalia's verbal aggressiveness:
Even so, it may not be easy to rattle Justice O'Connor. A former clerk
for another justice expressed doubt the other day that Justice O'Connor was
particularly perturbed by Justice Scalia's verbal slings.
Shortly after Justice Scalia joined the Court in 1986, the ex-clerk recalled,
the Justices met to discuss a pending case called Johnson v. Santa Clara
County, [480 U.S. 616 (1987),] which concerned the legality of an affirmative
action program intended to benefit women. Justice Scalia treated his new
colleagues to a 15-minute lecture on the evils of affirmative action, particularly
affirmative action for women. When he finshed, Justice O'Connor smiled
and, addressing him by his nickname, said, "Why, Nino, how do you think
I got my job?" Her eventual opimon supported the program; Justice Scalia
attacked it in a long dissent.
Greenhouse, At the Bar: Name-calling in the Supreme Court: When the Justices Vent Their
Spleen, Is There a Social Cost?, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1989, at B10, col. 1.
u H. GRILIOT & F SCHUBERT, INTRODUCTION TO LAW & THE LEGAL SYSTEM 164 (4th
ed. 1989).
"J. C~Avi & S. CoLnatA, AmucAN LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 30-31 (1989).
9o Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989).
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A. The Emerging Majority and Respect for Precedent
As the Supreme Court becomes increasingly comprised of ap-
pointees who are labeled as "conservative,' '91 one might expect the
Court to show increased deference to stare decists. As noted by
one scholar, "[a] hallmark of conservatism, whether political or
judicial is respect for and deference to tradition. In law, this
deference becomes stare decisis: we follow what has come before,
and the burden rests on those who would change it to persuade us
as to why "92 It is apparent, however, that the Supreme Court's
conservative justices seek "politically conservative results [through]
liberal judicial methods." 93 The emerging conservative majority
shows little reluctance to reverse case precedents, even when there
are judicial decisions over many years solidifying the original prec-
edent.
In City of Akron v Akron Center for Reproductive Health,94
Justice Powell issued a plea for adherence to case precedent in
abortion cases. Powell argued that there were "especially compel-
ling reasons for adhering to stare dectsis in applying the principles
of Roe v Wade" because at least mine subsequent Supreme Court
cases during an eight-year period affirmed the precedent. 95 If the
Supreme Court were to overturn Roe, the dramatic shift would be
damaging to the substantial public reliance on the well-established
public policy of making abortion choices available during the first
six months of pregnancy As Powell subsequently declared in a
veiled criticism of the emerging conservative majority, efforts to
overturn well-established precedents "represent explicit endorse-
ment of the idea that the Constitution is nothing more than what
five justices say it is. This would undermine the rule of law.' '96 By
91 President Nixon, who made four appointments to the Supreme Court, consistently
asserted that he wanted to select nominees who would be "properly conservative" and
would avoid imposing their views upon society. H. ABRArAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDmTS: A
PoLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THI SUPREME COURT 294-95 (2d ed. 1985). President
Reagan used his three Supreme Court appointments, as well as his other judicial appoint-
ments, as a means of advancing his conservative political philosophy. D. O'BRIN, supra
note 51, at 100-114. President Bush nominated Judge David Souter to replace Justice
Brennan, in part, because Souter was perceived to be a political and judicial conservative.
Apple, Bush's Move: Caution Wins, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1990, at Al, Ai8, col. 2.
92 Glennon, Will the Real Conservatives Please Stand Up?, 76 A.B.A. J. Aug. 1,
1990, at 49, 50.
93 Id.
- 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
11 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983).
6 Glennon, supra note 92, at 51.
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extension, such actions also undermine the Supreme Court's image
and legitimacy as a legal institution. With regard to abortion,
Powell's plea apparently was ignored by four justices who indi-
cated, either implicitly or explicitly, in Webster v Reproductive
Health Services"7 that they were prepared to overrule Roe. The
addition of Justice David Souter could lead to Roe's demise.
The emerging majority's inclination to overturn precedents is
evident in many cases. For example, although both Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy have written opinions emphasizing
the need to provide greater deference to previous decisions affecting
statutory interpretation than to decisions interpreting the Consti-
tution,9 neither justice hesitated to join a slim majority that re-
wrote two important antidiscrinnation statutes, without breathing
a word about their previously stated respect for precedent. 99
- -U.S. __, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). In Webster, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy and White thoroughly critiqued Blackmun's trimester analysis in Roe and
thereby indicated that they wished to change a decision that they viewed as deeply flawed.
Rehnquist and White were the only dissenters in Roe, so it is not surpnsing that they were
eager to undo a decision with which they had always disagreed. Justice Scalia was forthright
in his declaration that Roe should be reversed. Id. at 3064-67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that statutory interpretation precedents deserve greater
respect than constitutional precedents: "Stare decisis is a cornerstone of our legal system,
but it has less power in constitutional cases, where, save for constitutional amendments,
this Court is the only body able to make needed changes." Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3056 (1989). In a racial discrimination case,
Justice Kennedy wrote: "Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of
statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the
legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done."
Patterson, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S. Ct. at 2370.
" In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonto, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), a
five-member majority, including Rehnquist and Kennedy, increased the plaintiff's burden
of proof in certain employment discrimination cases and thereby altered a well-established
precedent in existence the previous eighteen years. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971) (holding that barriers to employment resulting in racial discrimnation are
prohibited notwithstanding the employer's lack of discriminatory intent, unless shown to be
related to job performance). Although downplaying the significance of the deviation from
precedent, Justice White admitted in the majority opinion that "[w]e acknowledge that
some of our earlier decisions can be read as suggesting [principles different than those we
put forth today]." Wards Cove Packing Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2126. In Patterson, a five-
member majority limited the scope of a thirteen-year old civil rights precedent in order to
preclude suits seeking damages for racial harassment. The new majority altered the precedent
after taking the extraordinary step of asking, sua sponte, for reargument to consider
reversing the precedent, Taylor, supra note 3, at 1, and after ignoring the request by forty-
seven state attorneys general, including both Republicans and Democrats, to leave the
precedent alone. Greenhouse, Court Upholds Use of Rights Law But Limits How It Can
Be Applied, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1989, Al, A12, col. 1.
According to one observer, these actions illustrate the emerging majority's aggressive-
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Rather than maintain the judicial conservative's usual rhetoric
about ensuring stability in law and avoiding excessive activism by
judges, members of the new majority explicitly state that they look
forward to additional changes in the Supreme Court's composition
so that they can reverse specific precedents with which they disa-
gree. When Justice Blackmun's change of heart led to the reversal
of a precedent affecting the applicability of federal labor laws to
state government employees, Justice Rehnquist's dissent stated, "I
do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out
further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in
time again command the support of a majority of this Court."'' 0
There is nothing unusual about Rehnquist's desire to restore the
prior precedent he favored. However, by eschewing reasoned ar-
gument and blatantly admitting that the political developments
underlying the Supreme Court's composition determine the direc-
tion of constitutional law, he did not follow the usual course of
protecting the Court's legitimacy by portraying it as an institution
that follows legal principle. In 1989, Justice Scalia criticized the
maority's decision favoring the rights of a criminal defendant and,
in arguing for the reversal of a precedent, noted that "[o]verrulings
of precedent rarely occur without a change m the Court's person-
nel." 101 Furthermore, as he had done in abortion 02 and affirmative
action cases, Scalia forthrightly stated that he is concerned with
advancing hIs own views of the Constitution regardless of contrary
case precedents' 03-a view that is understandable from one sworn
to uphold the Constitution, but one that is distinctly different from
that of a true judicial conservative.'1 4
ness in attacking civil rights precedents with which they disagree: "Conservative insistence
on judicial diffidence when it comes to expanding constitutional rights is notorious and
persistent. [The conservative justices'] attitude shifts dramatically, however, when it
comes to liberal legislation. There one finds an almost arrogant aggressiveness in narrowly
reading laws for minorities, women, the handicapped, and the elderly." Schwartz, Is the
Rehnquist Court Activist? Yes: A Definite Agenda, 76 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1990, at 32.
101 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985).
10, South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2217 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
-- See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3067 (Scalia, J., concumng) ("It thus appears that the
mansion of constitutionalized abortion-law, constructed overnight in Roe v. Wade, must be
disassembled door-jamb by door-jamb, and never entirely brought down, no matter how
wrong it may be").
103 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2218 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In any case, I would think it
a violation of my oath to adhere to what I consider a plainly unjustified intrusion upon
the democratic process in order that the Court might save face").
,04 Scalia acknowledges the possibility that there might be some undesirable precedents
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B. Opportunities for Reversals by a Court Without Brennan
The possibility for quick reversal of established precedents looms
large in the wake of Brennan's retirement. There are many areas
of constitutional law in which the controlling precedents were
established by slim majorities that relied upon Brennan's vote and
influence as a coalition builder. 05
1. Abortion
The continued vitality of Roe v Wade, 6 and a woman's nght
of choice regarding abortion, immediately became the focus of
speculation when President Bush nominated Judge Souter to re-
place Justice Brennan.107 Although President Bush attempted to
m nmuze the controversy byasserting that he did not know Judge
Souter's views on abortion, 08 Bush may be held responsible by the
electorate for whatever is nominee does (or does not do) on the
issue of abortion. 1°9 Roe and the constitutional right to obtain an
abortion continue to survive by one vote. Although the Court
reaffirmed Roe in numerous cases between 1973 and 1989,110 four
that "have become so embedded in our system of government that return is no longer
possible," Id., but he has not indicated which precedents those rmght be. In Patterson,
despite Scalia's efforts dunng oral argument to encourage the attorney for the credit umon
to supply the justices with a persuasive argument that would permit reversal of the entire
civil rights precedent, Greenhouse, Justices Seem Unswayed By Civil Rights Debate They
Sought, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1988, at A23, col. 1, the majority ultimately claimed that
they upheld the precedent because it was well-established and workable. Patterson, 109 S.
Ct. at 2370-72. Justice Brennan observed, however, that "[w]hat the Court declines to
snatch away with one hand, it takes with other," Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2379 (Brennan,
J., concumng in judgment m part and dissenting in part),-because, in the words of one
commentator, the five-member majority "pulled the teeth from [the civil nghts] statute,"
Epstein, supra note 1, at A10, by eliminating suits for racial harassment. Thus, this
purported adherence to an established precedent with which Scalia seemed to disagree
actually involved a significant alteration in the precedent.
os See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan is widely regarded
as the "architect and strategist behind the [Supreme C]ourt's virtual remaking of the
Constitution" during the Warren Court era. Kaplan, A Master Builder, Newsweek, July
30, 1990, at 19.
' 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'o' See Morganthau, supra note 30, at 17.
' See Dowd, Souter, New Hampshire Judge, Named by Bush for High Court; No
'Litmus Test,' President Says, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1990, at Al, col. 3.
119 Kramer, Asking the Wrong Questions, Time, Aug. 13, 1990, at 36.
11 See, eg., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986) (holding statute requiring physicians to inform patients of abortion risks
and alternatives unconstitutional); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983) (holding parental consent, twenty-four hour waiting period, and
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justices are poised for a quick reversal if they gain a like-minded
new colleague. In Webster v Reproductive Health Services, Scalia,
Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy indicated that they are prepared
to reverse the precedent as soon as they secure the needed fifth
vote.11'
2. Affirmative Action
The remaimng precedents supporting affirmative action hang
by the proverbial thread. The emerging majority has already dis-
pensed with some aspects of affirmative action, such as local
government contract preferences for minority business enterprises,
absent clear proof that the government itself engaged in discrimi-
nation."2 Although minority preferences in federal media franchise
licenses survived a challenge by a five-to-four margin in 1990,11
Brennan's departure opens the possibility that strident opponents
of all affirmative action programs, such as Scalia, Rehnquist, and
Kennedy, will be able to obtain the additional vote they need to
invalidate the Federal Commumcations Commission program. Ad-
ditionally, if Brennan's replacement is willing to overturn affir-
mative action precedents, there may be reversals of the other
surviving case decisions involving federal contracting preferences," 4
broad remedial judicial orders applying hiring quotas," 5 voluntary
employment plans including categorical preferences in the public"16
requirement that second trimester abortion be performed in a hospital unconstitutional);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding parental
and spousal consent statute unconstitutional).
"I Although abortion is a matter of enormous symbolic value to the opposing interest
groups mobilized to take action regarding the issue, any reversal of Roe will have less
practical impact than most people imagine. In Webster, five members of the Supreme Court
already invited the states to regulate abortions and make abortions more difficultto obtain,
even if they cannot yet abolish abortion. If a new appointee votes to reverse Roe, then
abortions will remain available in many states because anti-abortion forces lack the political
muscle to push most state legislatures to ban abortion. See McDamel, The Future of
Abortion, Newsweek, July 17, 1989, at, 14 et seq.
112 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
"I Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, - U.S.
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
114 Only Justices Marshall, White, and Blackmun remain from the majority in Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
"I Justice Brennan was a member of the five-member majority in United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
116 Justices Brennan and Powell were members of the six-member majority in Johnson
v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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and private sectors,1 7 and even preferential admissions in higher
education."'
3. The "Exclusionary Rule" and Rights of Criminal Defendants
The emerging majority on the Supreme Court actively curtailed
the rights of criminal defendants" 9 by placing limitations on tra-
ditional Miranda20 rights,' 2 ' granting police more power to under-
take warrantless searches,'2 and easing the restrictions on capital
punishment despite due process and equal protection problems.'23
117 Only Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Marshall, and White remain from the majority
in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Although Justice
O'Connor supported the use of gender as a criterion in the hiring decision in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, it seems doubtful that she would support a broad voluntary affir-
mative action traimng program that contained a hiring quota for minorities, as in United
Steelworkers, because her opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. argues for
narrowly tailored programs to remedy proven past discrimnation.
" Only Justices Black, White, and Marshall remain from the five-member majority
that approved the use of race-conscious criteria in admissions decisions in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
"9 See Smith, Police Professionalism and the Rights of Criminal Defendants, 26 Cans.
L. BOLL. 155 (1990).
'2 The principles enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), require law
enforcement officers to inform arrestees of their rights prior to questioning.
2I In Duckworth v. Eagan, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989), police officers'
were allowed to deviate from normal Miranda warnings even when their presentation implied
to the suspect that he might not be able to have his constitutional right to counsel fulfilled
before questiomng. In Illinois v. Perkins, - U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990), police
officers disguised as prison inmates did not need t6"inform fellow prisoners of their rights
before questioning them. See Greenhouse, Justices Say the Police Can Use Deceit to Gain
Confessions From Prisoners, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1990, at A24, col. 1.
'1 A closely-divided Court ruled that fourth amendment restrictions are inapplicable
to United States law enforcement officers conducting searches in foreign countries. United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, -U.S. -, I10 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). A majority of the
justices also ruled that police may search a residence without a warrant if they receive
permission from someone who does not reside there, but whom the police "reasonably
believe" lives there. Illinois v. Rodriguez, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
3 Despite strong statistical evidence of racial discrimination in capital sentencing, a
five-member majority declined to interfere with Georgia's capital punishment process.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In Murray v. Giarratano, - U.S. -, 109
S. Ct. 2765 (1989), despite evidence that a majority of death penalty convictions are found
to be defective during appellate review in the federal courts, a slim majority of the justices-
refused to recognize a right to counsel for indigent prisoners on death row seeking collateral
review of their convictions and sentences. By refusing to apply a later decision retroactively,
a five-member majority upheld the death sentence of a prisoner while admitting that his
rights had been violated during police questioning. Butler v. McKellar, - U.S. -,
110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990). In Butler, although the Supreme Court does not discuss all of the
factual circumstances, the defendant who faced execution, despite having his rights violated
by police questioning outside of the presence of his attorney, was a severely retarded man
who had the mental functioning of a nine-year-old. Marcus, Waiting Forever on Death
Row, Wash. Post Nat'l W'kly, June 18-24, at 11.
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In a 1990 test of the exclusionary rule's vitality, a narrow five-
member majority declared that illegally obtained evidence could
not be used to impeach a witness's testimony 124 Justice Brennan
was one of the five justices upholding the rule, and his departure
may lead to further reductions m the constitutional protections for
crimnal defendants. 12
4. The Judiciary's Remedial Powers
The five members of the Court's emerging conservative major-
ity have acted to limit the ability of federal judges to impose
remedial orders in civil rights cases. In Martin v Wilks,'26 this slim
majority permitted intervenors to halt the implementation of a
consent decree designed to remedy a longstanding employment
discrimination case. In Spallone v United States,12 7 over Justice
Brennan's objections that public officials will be encouraged to
resist judicial orders, 12 the five-member majority determined that
a district judge had to consider more options before levying fines
against public officials who flouted judicial orders in a civil rights
case. Although Brennan was a member of a narrow majority that
approved a federal judge's authority to order a local tax increase
in order to implement a school desegregation plan,129 his departure
may mean that he helped to establish only a short-lived precedent.
C. Sudden Changes and the Supreme Court's Legitimacy
Justice Brennan was reportedly "galled by the [C]ourt's reading
,of civil-rights statutes, its loosening of Fourth Amendment res-
traints on police power, and perhaps most of all its continuing
,14 James v. Illinois, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990).
' Not all aspects of the exclusionary rule are threatened by Brennan's departure. The
"plain view" doctnne, which limits a police officer's ability to extend warrantless searches
beyond objects in plain view, has been supported by Justices Scalia, Blackmun, Marshall,
White, and Stevens. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). In 1990, although main-
taining the rule's existence, seven justices interpreted the rule more broadly than Justices
.Brennan and Marshall in-order to permit the legal seizure of items that were not discovered
"inadvertently." See Horton v. California, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
1- 490 U.S. 754, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
17 -_ U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990).
'"' Brennan wrote in his dissent that, "[I] worry that the Court's message will have
the unintended effect of emboldening recalcitrant officials continually to test the ultimate
reach of the remedial authority of the federal courts. " Id. at 648 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
'1 Missouri v. Jenkins, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
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approval of capital punishment. ' 130 His disappointment will un-
doubtedly grow if his former colleagues and his replacement ac-
tively seek to overturn case precedents. There are so many issues
on which the Court is deeply divided that there will be many
opportunities for the emerging majority to move constitutional law
quickly in entirely new directions. Sudden changes in case decisions
and concomitant public policies may adversely affect the Supreme
Court's image as a legal institution. Thus, Justice Souter will be
called upon to assess the potential harm that may befall the Court
as an institution as a result of facilitating wholesale changes in
established precedents. Obviously, several current members of the
Court share Justice Scalia's view that "it [is] a violation of my
oath to adhere to [established precedents] . in order that the
Court might save face. 1 31 Such disregard for the role of stare
decists in protecting the Supreme Court's image and legitimacy
creates great uncertainty about what the Court's domnnant new
majority will do in the immediate future.
IV LEGITIMACY AND THE SUPREME CouRT's COMPOSITION
The image and legitimacy of the Supreme Court may be af-
fected by the fact that the Court will now be composed of seven
Republicans and only two Democrats. Although scholars argue
that having a diverse pool of judicial officers "can result in a
strengthened judiciary whose presence can reassure certain segments
of the population of the neutrality and fairness of the judicial
process,' ' 32 the composition of the Supreme Court is politically
skewed in favor of a political party that dan claim the affiliation
of only one-third of the population. 33 The precise composition of
the Supreme Court is determined by unplanned events that have
significant impact upon the selection of new appointees.' 34 Deaths,
23 Kaplan, supra note 105, at 20.
,' South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2218 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
,12 Goldman, Judicial Selection and the Qualities that Make a "Good" Judge, 462
ANNALS 112, 119 (1982).
M Surveys in 1986 indicated that only thirty-three percent of Americans identified
themselves as Republicans. Forty percent of the public identified themselves as Democrats
and twenty-seven percent identified themselves as Independents. E. LADD, Tim Ammuc~A
POLITY 491 (2d ed. 1987).
IM President Johnson's political miscalculation in attempting to elevate his friend Abe
Fortas to Chief Justice in the late 1960's ultimately allowed President Nixon to make two
additional appointments to replace justices whose slots should have been filled by Johnson
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the aging process, and illness can lead to unplanned retirements by
justices such as Brennan who presumably did not .expect to retire
while the opposing political party controlled the White House.
In a speech to a judges' conference, Justice Blackmun publicly
raised concern about the effect of the 1988 presidential election on
the Supreme Court's composition. 13 Although Blackmun made his
observation out of concern for the future of constitutional law and
the institution of the Court, he. was criticized by commentators for
erroneously "reject[ing] or [failing to] believe that the Court's
status depends largely on the public perception that Justices stay
above the political fray "1136 A grossly unbalanced Supreme Court,
however, may threaten the institution's legitimacy either by losing
public confidence in the Court's objectivity or by becoming out of
step with the values and policies of mainstream society
According to scholarly theories about the Supreme Court's role
in the American political system, "the main contribution of the
Court is to confer legality and constitutionality on the fundamental
policies of the successful [political], coalition [that leads the insti-
tutions of government].' ' 137 In some areas of law, most notably
civil rights, the aggressive attacks on case precedents by the emerg-
ing majority on the contemporary Supreme Court place the leading
legal institution out of step with dominant societal values favoring
the protection of rights of victimized minorities. This deviation
from the mainstream is most evident in the passage by Congress,
with comfortable margins of 65 to 34 in the Senate138 and 272 to
154 in the House of Representatives, 139 of the Civil Rights Act of
appointees. See H. ABRAHAm, supra note 91, at 284-88. President Reagan's election to the
White House in 1980 was facilitated by the Iranian hostage crisis and John Anderson's
decision to run for the presidency as an independent. If not for those two events, Democrat
Jimmy Carter might have remained as President during the early 1980's and thereby gained
opportunities to appoint new justices. See Smith, What If. "" Critical Junctures on the
Road to (In)Equality, 15 T. MARSHALL L. Rav 1 (1989-90).
M According to Blackmun, "for better or for worse, depending on your point of view,
the 1988 election will be a very significant one. The Court could become, if I use those old
labels again, very conservative well into the twenty-first century if the election goes one
way; if it goes the other way, who knows." Address by Justice Harry Blackmun, Eighth
Circuit Judicial Conference (July 15, 1988).
1-6 O'Brien & Collins, The Wisdom of Judicial Lockjaw, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1988,
at A27, col. 1.
,17 R. DAHi, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATEs 161 (4th ed. 1981).
"I' Holmes, No Compromise, Say Civil Rights Bill's Sponsors, N.Y. Times, July 24,
1990, at A14, col. 1.
"I Berke, House Approves Civil Rights Bill; Veto Is Weighed, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4,
1990, at 1, 11, col. 4.
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1990. Congress designed the Civil Rights Act specifically to undo
the emerging five-member conservative majority's 1989 decisions
in Martin v Wilks, 140 Wards Cove Packing Co. v Atonio, 141 and
Patterson v McLean Credit Union,'142 in which civil rights prece-
dents were constricted.143
Although the public may have relatively little awareness of the
specific details of judicial processes and decisions, 44 public opinion
research indicates that the public's perceptions of the Supreme
Court are influenced by the justices' actions.' 45 If the new Supreme
Court majority continues to collide with Congress in its efforts to
reverse established precedents in civil rights and other areas, there
may be a cost to the Court's image and legitimacy After studying
public opinion data concerning the Supreme Court, one scholar
concluded,
Expressed consistently, judicial opposition to Congress may in
and of itself lead to resentment and loss of trust among the
public-not because of any great love of the national legislature
but, rather, as a result of the perception that the Court has upset
the balance of our constitutional system.'4
Unabashed activism by the politically unrepresentative Supreme
Court may thus tarnish the public's perception of the Court's
position in the governing system.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court became more conservative in the
1970's with the addition of President 'Nixon's four appointees, 47
the Court did not retreat significantly from the precedents estab-
lished by its Warren Court predecessors."'8 When President Reagan
1- 490 U.S. 754, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989). See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
.4 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). See supra note 99.
491 U.S. 164, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). See supra note 98.
,, See'Moore, House OKs Right Bill, But It Faces Bush's Veto, Akron Beacon J.,
Aug. 4, 1990, at Ai, A3, col.
'" See Hyde, supra note 27, at 408.
'" See Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's Court-Packing
Plan, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1139 (1987).
,46 Caldeira, Neither The Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the
Supreme Court, 80 AM. PoL. Sci. REv 1209, 1222 (1986).
,,1 See THE BURGER YEAts: Ri;HTS AND WRONGS IN THE StPEME COURT 1969-1986
(H. Schwartz ed. 1987).
" See THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V Blasi ed.
1983).
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made his concerted effort to fill the federal judiciary, including
the Supreme Court, with ideological conservatives, 149 the Supreme
Court entered a transitional era in which an emerging conservative
majority initiated decisions abruptly shifting the development of
law in several substantive areas. 50 As one observer commented,
"Despite a Republican hold on the presidency for all but four
years since 1968, the anticipated conservative coming, which has
been either hoped-for or dreaded, depending on one's perspective,
did not materialize until [1989]"' with the participation of Justice
Kennedy during an entire term.
The retirement of Justice Brennan will lead to further changes
in the Supreme Court-changes that ultimately may affect the
Court's image and legitimacy as the nation's leading legal institu-
tion. In the wake of Brennan's departure, if the justices' increas-
ingly combative opimons and interactions continue to become more
pronounced, the Court's decision making processes may begin to
look more like a legislative body, affected by petty squabbles and
indignant name calling. Moreover, if the emerging majority engages
in wholesale reversals of established precedents, they will throw
into question the qualities of stability and predictability that are
purportedly hallmarks of the law Because the Supreme Court is
composed of conservative Republicans to a degree grossly dispro-
portionate with the composition and views of the American public,
these justices should pay special attention to the institutional con-
sequences of their interactions and decisions lest the Supreme Court
lose its legitimacy and effectiveness by suddenly becoming perceived
as intimately associated with partisan values and policy preferences.
"I9 See H. ScHw .Tz, PACKING TaE COURTS (1988); E. Wrrr, A D13ERENr JusncE:
REAGAN AND THE SuPREME COURT (1986).
I" One scholar has noted that the abrupt shifts led by the Supreme Court's emerging
conservative majority will affect the work of legal scholars: "The advent of the Reagan-
Rehnquist Court presents an opportunity for some corrective perestroika, as a broader set
of constitutional scholars now suddenly expenence the same frustrations that those con-
cerned with crumnal procedure have been facing for almost twenty years-the frustrations
of living with a Court pursuing a pre-deterrmned course toward Constitutional retrench-
ment." Kannar, supra note 16, at 1344.
"I Glennon, supra note 92, at 49.
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